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I. INTRODUCTION
To read the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)1 is to be impressed with the ambition and promise of special
education.
The statute guarantees disabled students a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE) in the “least restrictive
environment.”2 At the core of this guarantee lies an entitlement for
the parents of a disabled child to collaborate with teachers and school
administrators to craft an educational program that is both tailored to
the child’s unique needs and designed to help her make progress in
her education. This entitlement, and the IDEA generally, represents
an enormous advance for children with disabilities—a community
that, for generations, passed through school with minimal learning, or
worse, were excluded from school altogether.3
But as is often true with respect to rights bestowed by law,
issues of interpretation and enforcement exist. In the context of the
IDEA, these issues relate to what school districts are required to
provide to disabled children and how to ensure that the districts are
meeting those requirements. For instance, a parent may believe that
in order to receive an “appropriate” education, her child needs speech
therapy in school, and a school district may believe otherwise; a
school district may believe that a child should be placed in a
specialized classroom for autistic children, and a parent may
disagree; a parent may believe that her child’s progress toward
*Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School,
Pediatric Advocacy Initiative. I extend my gratitude to Gil Seinfeld, Paul
Reingold, and Kim Thomas for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Many
thanks to Kristina Liu for excellent research assistance.
1

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006). The Act was originally titled the
“Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.” Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 852 (1975). The name was changed to the “Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act” (IDEA) in 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141-42 (1990).
2
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (3) (2006). This means that, to the maximum
extent appropriate, disabled children are to be educated with their non-disabled
peers.
3
When federal special education legislation was first enacted in 1975, less
than half of the eight million disabled children in the United States were receiving
an appropriate education. Nearly two million disabled children were receiving no
education at all. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
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certain educational goals is so tenuous that she requires extended
school year services to prevent regression, and the school district
may regard such services as unnecessary.
The IDEA contemplates extensive parental involvement in
the design of an education plan appropriate to each individual child.
When disagreements arise between parents and school districts, it
also provides parents with access to legal remedies, including the
ability for parents to sue to enforce the guarantees of special
education.4 But a variety of structural and economic factors have
prevented the fulfillment of the statute’s promise, from the
development of appropriate individualized education programs for
disabled students to the enforcement of the IDEA’s educational
guarantees. These factors include the limited ability of parents to
collaborate effectively with school districts; a judicial construction of
“free appropriate public education” that sets an exceedingly low bar
for school districts; significant disparities in school districts’ and
parents’ access to legal counsel, which affects both the bargaining
power of parents and their ability to win a lawsuit, should they need
to enforce the IDEA; and finally, the tension between the IDEA’s
guarantee of a free appropriate public education and the resource
constraints faced by school districts constantly lurks in the
background.5
This article highlights the myriad forces that impede the
realization of the IDEA’s goals. Part II gives an overview of the
history of special education and the special education process under
the IDEA, particularly as it relates to the cooperative development of
an individualized education program (IEP) for a disabled child. Part
III examines features of the special education process that operate to
the systematic detriment of parents, particularly low-income parents,
and prevent them from securing an “appropriate education” for their
children. I am not the first to note ways in which parents are at a
disadvantage both in negotiating with, and litigating against, school
districts.6 What Part III does is assemble these critiques and add one
4

20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(6) (2006).
See infra Part III.
6
See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of
Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1432 (2011) (describing in
detail the barriers that parents, especially low-income parents, face in enforcing the
IDEA and urging greater public enforcement of the IDEA); Joanne Karger, A New
5
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that has not received attention: the ability of some school districts to
obtain insurance to cover their litigation costs should parents sue
them under the IDEA, and the effect that this insurance has on the
special education process. Part IV concludes with an overview of
recent scholarly suggestions for improvement and observations based
on my experience practicing special education law.

II. THE IDEA AND THE IEP PROCESS
A. Precursors to Enactment
Parents of disabled children played a significant role in the
development and advancement of special education law.7 Between
the 1950s and the early 1970s, parents lobbied aggressively to root
out entrenched discrimination against children with disabilities.8 The
Perspective on Schaffer v. Weast: Using A Social-Relations Approach to Determine
the Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Special Education Due Process Hearings,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 133, 154 (2008) (“While the intent of IDEA is
for parents to become partners with school districts in the development of their
child’s educational program, research has shown that many parents feel denigrated
in their relationships with school personnel, who are in the positions of power.”);
Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special
Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1833 (2008) (“If the system now requires parents
to make smart, consumer-like decisions, those without the requisite material, social,
and cultural capital are at a marked disadvantage in their role as advocates for their
children.”); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Parents as Quasi-Therapists Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 911 (2008)
(“[T]he IEP process often involves a tension and conflict between parents who
naturally want what is best for their child and school districts who are often looking
at the cost of providing special education services.”); Daniela Caruso, Bargaining
and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172–
73 (2005) (”The current [special education] system yields lower payoffs for needier
families, which are on average less endowed with bargaining power and therefore
less capable of taking advantage of participation opportunities.”).
7
See Marvin Lazerson, The Origins of Special Education, in SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES 38 (1983) (“It is hard to overestimate the impact of parental
organizations on special education in the 1950s and 1960s: they were successful
agitators for the expansion of the system . . . through letter writing campaigns,
through lobbying pressures in state legislatures and departments of education, and
through the development of national coordinating groups, they forced the transfer
of larger portions of educational funds to special education.”).
8
Id.
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timing of this development was no accident, as there were important
points of connection between the movement for disabled children’s
educational rights and the civil rights movement more generally.
First, the rhetoric and practice of segregation (familiar from the battle
over racial equality) was central to the experience of families with
disabled children. These parents struggled with policies that had the
intended effect of keeping “crippled children” away from “normal”
children by separating them until the former dropped out of school.9
Second, many of the children deemed by educators to be
“handicapped” were non-white and/or spoke foreign languages.10 As
the racial desegregation movement took hold, middle-class white
parents of disabled children and their allies drew upon the rhetoric
and leveraged the salience of the fight against racially segregated
education to “le[ad] the attack on exclusion from the educational
system.”11 Non-white and non-English speaking parents joined in the
fight against an education system that was segregating their children
under the guise of disability.12
Employing a rights-based approach to desegregation in
special education, groups representing disabled children took to the
courts. In 1972, two watershed education cases were decided,
thereby bringing the segregation of children with special needs from
“mainstream” public education into the cultural consciousness and
into the constitutional rights framework. First, in Pennsylvania
Association of Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, a federal district court approved a settlement
agreement in a class action, enjoining Pennsylvania from excluding
“retarded” children from public education.13
The state had
previously deemed the relevant class of students “uneducable and
untrainable.”14 The court found that the plaintiffs had “established a
colorable constitutional claim,” and that their right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when

9

Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
11
Id.
12
Lazerson, supra note 7, at 41.
13
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The court noted that an estimated
70,000–80,000 children between the ages of five and twenty-one were denied
access to any public education services. Id. at 296.
14
Id. at 282.
10
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the state denied public education to children deemed “mentally
retarded” while providing public education to non-impaired
children.15 In approving the parties’ settlement, the court explained:
“This is a noble and humanitarian end in which the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania has chosen to join. Today, with the following Order,
this group of citizens will have new hope in their quest for a life of
dignity and self-sufficiency.”16
Just three months later, in Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia, a federal district court determined that the
District of Columbia had violated the due process rights of disabled
children by excluding them from school without providing any
educational alternative.17 The court held that the District is obligated
to provide each school-aged child a “free and suitable publiclysupported education, regardless of the degree of the child’s . . .
disability or impairment.”18 The court’s highly detailed order
regarding the provision of education for children with disabilities laid
a blueprint for what would later become federal special education
law, complete with a requirement to identify disabled children in
need of services, individually tailored education plans, compensatory
education, and due process rights.19
These court rulings establishing a right to an education were a
victory for disabled children, but were insufficient to form the basis
of a robust system of special education. Legislative action was
necessary to place special education on secure footing, chiefly
because without it, special education programs could not be assured
of funding.20 The 1975 enactment of the Education for All

15

Id. at 288 n. 19.
Id. at 302.
17
348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972). Years earlier, the court had
proclaimed that “the equal protection clause in its application to public school
education—is in its full sweep a component of due process binding on the District
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).
18
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
19
Id. at 878–83.
20
Jack Tweedie, The Politics of Legalization in Special Education
Reform, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 48, 54 (1983). As we will see, even with
legislative action, access to funding for special education programming remains a
persistent problem.
16
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Handicapped Children Act21—the precursor to the IDEA—promised
change. It guaranteed at least some federal funding for special
education programming in public schools and mandated that disabled
children receive a free appropriate public education in the least
restrictive environment;22 that is, children in need of special
education services were to be integrated into the general education
system to the maximum extent appropriate.
B. Developing an IEP
The guarantee of a free appropriate public education (FAPE)
for eligible students is the cornerstone of special education law. The
IDEA defines FAPE as the following:
[S]pecial education and related services that—(A)
have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge; (B)
meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State
involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under
section 1414(d) of this title.23
As becomes immediately apparent, this is a “definition” in name
only; it provides no guidance or instruction as to what constitutes an
“appropriate education.” It does, however, set up a procedure for the
provision of FAPE: the requirement of an “individualized education
program” (IEP).24 The IEP operates like a contract between the
school district and the student; it is a document created after
negotiations between two parties (the parents and the school district),
and the terms written into the IEP are legally enforceable.25 This
21

Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
The IDEA is “spending clause” legislation—it offers federal funds to
states that meet the conditions required for their receipt. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
23
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
24
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
25
Professor Daniela Caruso unpacks this analogy in her article,
Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education. Caruso, supra note 6. Caruso
22
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contract performs several functions: it recognizes the child’s
eligibility for special education, summarizes the child’s present levels
of academic achievement and performance, lays out specific and
measurable educational goals for the student, and lists any services
and accommodations the school district is to provide.26
A student’s IEP is created at a meeting of his or her “IEP
team” and is revised by that team annually.27 By law, this team must
include a general education teacher, a special education teacher, a
representative from the school district, and a parent of the child.28
Often, and depending on the child’s disabilities, other professionals,
such as speech therapists, social workers, psychologists, and
occupational therapists are part of the IEP team.29 While the law
does not mandate parental participation in the IEP process,30 it does
express a strong preference for parental involvement. Parents must
be invited to participate in IEP meetings; school districts are required
to accommodate parents’ schedules in setting meeting times; and an
interpreter must be provided in the event that the parent is deaf or not
a native English speaker.31

makes clear that the similarities between negotiating an IEP and negotiating a
contract are really only present where empowered (educated, informed, wealthy)
parents are sitting across the table from the school district. Id. at 178. Caruso
notes that the “consideration” offered by the parents in an IEP contract negotiation
is the implicit promise not to bring a due process hearing against the district for a
denial of FAPE. Id. at 179–80. Crucially, Caruso notes that parents who are not
sufficiently empowered to bring a lawsuit—because they do not know they can or
because they do not have the means to hire an attorney—have less consideration to
offer and therefore wind up with a less robust IEP. Id. at 184. In those instances,
and because special education services are actually a legal entitlement for eligible
children, the relationship between disempowered parents and the school district is
more similar to the relationship between consumers of public benefits and the
government agency that provides the benefits. For wealthier parents, however, an
IEP (in both its development and the final product) maintains the equivalence of a
contract. Id. at 176.
26
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
27
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
28
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2006).
29
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi) (2006).
30
The public agency must take steps to ensure parent participation in an
IEP meeting, but is able to conduct an IEP meeting in the absence of a parent. 34
C.F.R. § 300.322(d) (2012).
31
34 C.F.R. § 300.322(e) (2012).
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, the IEP meeting is
intended to be a “cooperative process . . . between parents and
schools.”32 This intention is reflected in the statutory scheme in a
variety of ways. First, and most obvious, the statute’s use of the term
“team” signals that the participants should work together and are “on
the same side”—the side of the disabled student. Second, and more
importantly, there are no formal votes in an IEP meeting. No one
person or entity bears the burden of persuasion;33 the team is to make
a group decision on the content of the IEP.34 The goal is for the team
to discuss the child’s academic and functional achievements and to
develop an individually tailored plan to help that child succeed.35
The process of determining what constitutes an appropriate education
for a given child is meant to be a dynamic one characterized by
mutual respect and the sharing of information and ideas between
parent and school.
Schools hold IEP team meetings every year, often with little
or no discord. The team works its way through the district’s IEP
form—a document created by either the department of education in a
state or the individual school district36—and crafts an education
program for the disabled student. At times, however, the IEP
collaboration fractures, and parents and school districts find
themselves in opposition to one another. When this happens,
important disparities between parents and school districts emerge,
and these disparities, working in tandem with legal doctrine, resource
constraints, and imbalances in parents’ and school districts’ access to
legal counsel and insurance coverage, have prevented the IDEA from

32

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (“The core of the statute . . .
is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools . . . . [t]he
central vehicle for this collaboration is the IEP process”).
33
As I explain below, this ceases to be the case when parents and school
districts cannot agree on an IEP and formal dispute resolution processes begin. See
infra Part III.B.2. Under those conditions, the party challenging the IEP (typically
the parent) bears the burden of persuading the hearing officer or the court that the
existing plan is legally defective. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
34
34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2012).
35
Id.
36
The IEP form is a document that lists all of the elements that are
required to be written into an IEP (such as specific educational goals for the child,
the child’s present levels of academic achievement, and the type of services to be
provided to the child) and provides space for the IEP team to record its decisions.
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delivering meaningfully on its promise of a free appropriate public
education.37
III. SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PRACTICE
In this section, I examine the factors that shape the IEP
process as it actually operates.
Part III.A focuses on the
psychological, professional, and personal dynamics of parent-district
relationships that can undermine the collaborative scheme imagined
by the IDEA. Part III.B zeroes in on the FAPE standard and
examines the legal and economic factors that have made the
guarantee of a “free appropriate public education” into something
less than it might have been. Part III.C, finally, considers the effect
of legal representation and insurance coverage on special education
litigation.
A. The Uneasy Collaboration Between Parents and School
Districts
Because a child’s IEP team consists almost entirely of school
district personnel, when parents and school districts disagree
regarding the services and accommodations a child needs in order to
receive an appropriate education, parents may be the lone dissenting
voice on the IEP team. Depending on the nature of the child’s
disability, IEP meetings may be attended by as few as three, and
upwards of ten, representatives of the school district.38 Even when a
parent brings an advocate39 and/or private experts40 to the meeting,
the parent is almost always outnumbered.
37

See infra Part III. To be sure, there are parents who make unreasonable
demands on school districts, asking for services their children do not need or
services that are so extravagant that few would assume that a school district would
be responsible for providing them. This paper is not about those parents—it is
about the reasonable, concerned parents who have an idea and an expectation about
what would constitute an “appropriate” education for their disabled child and who
butt into the dual reality of a narrow definition of “appropriate” by courts and of
limited resources available to school districts.
38
See supra Part II.B.
39
Special education advocates are professionals, trained in the rules of
special education, who advise parents in the special education process. But they
are not attorneys and cannot represent parents in legal proceedings. The Counsel of
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Under ideal circumstances, the parent is regarded by the IEP
team as an expert on her child. The parent presumably knows her
child better than anyone else at the meeting and can, therefore,
provide important information to the team. But school districts do
not always perceive parental input this way. At times, parents are
seen by school districts as lacking the emotional distance or
education needed to meaningfully assist in the process of devising an
education plan for the child.41 In connection with a study of families
navigating the special education system in New York, one
commenter explained:
Often, but not always, parents feel that their own
observations or requests are given little weight and
that decisions are based primarily on the
recommendations of the professionals. Their own
close relationship with the child is viewed as a
liability rather than as an asset—a liability that renders
their judgments inherently suspect.42
There can be a territorial element at play in these meetings,
which may manifest itself in deliberate attempts by educators and
school personnel to exclude parents from meaningful participation in
developing the IEP.43 Unsurprisingly, there is “strong resentment by

Parent Attorneys and Advocates has written a code of conduct for special education
advocates, which is available online. Voluntary Code of Ethics for Special
Education Advocates, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, INC.
(COPAA), http://www.copaa.org/membership/advocates/791-2/.
40
Parents sometimes bring their child’s doctor or psychologist or other
professional who has conducted an evaluation with the child to the IEP team
meeting. These professionals often have valuable insight into the needs of the
child.
41
Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A
Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 331,
363 (1994) (citing Roland K. Yoshida et al., Parental Involvement in the Special
Education Pupil Planning Process: The School's Perspective, 44 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 531, 533 (1978)).
42
David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities, 1991
DUKE L.J. 166, 188 (1991).
43
In one example, I participated in an IEP meeting in which the parent
was urging the school district to place her child in a particular school. The lawyer
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educators of the parental right and power under the Act to challenge
the educators’ professional judgment.”44 Where this dynamic is
present, according to the New York study, “[t]he educators’ response
has often been to seek consciously to circumvent the principle of
parental involvement which underlies the Act.”45
But the problem is not limited to cases involving intentional
efforts on the part of educators to exclude parents from true
membership on the IEP team. Typically, there are significant
asymmetries in the expertise level of parents and school district
personnel, and these asymmetries can warp the deliberative process.
Thus, while parents may have a deep sense of their child’s character,
of what challenges her, or what makes her happy or sad, they
typically do not have access to the technical language of psychoeducational testing and educational interventions. And this can cause
parents to be shunted aside during the IEP process as they are
bombarded with professional terminology in which they are not
conversant. (When I began practicing special education law, I had
the experience of attending IEP meetings and struggling simply to
assimilate the jargon, let alone contribute in a meaningful way to
advance my clients’ interests.
To individuals without prior
experience or training, it can feel as if IEP teams speak a foreign
language.)
Courts have taken heed of this asymmetry, but they do not
tend to give it operative weight when deciding cases.46 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast is illustrative.47 In Schaffer, the
Court acknowledged that school districts enjoy a “natural advantage”
with respect to educational expertise; but the Court insisted that the
right of parents to access information from school districts, together
for the district responded pointedly: “this is the district’s IEP.” This sentiment,
while often present, is not usually made explicit.
44
Kotler, supra note 41, at 366.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist.,
995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[i]n practical terms, the school
has an advantage when a dispute arises under the Act: the school has better access
to the relevant information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive
witnesses (those who have been directly involved in the child’s education), and
greater overall educational expertise than the parents.”). See also Engel, supra note
42, at 189.
47
546 U.S. 49 (2005).
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with the IDEA’s procedural safeguards, serve to mitigate parents’
corresponding disadvantage.48
Parents do have significant procedural protections under the
IDEA.49 For example, in making decisions about placement and
programming for a disabled child, the IEP team relies on information
from the child’s most recent evaluations. School districts are
obligated to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of a child with a
disability every three years.50 The district typically conducts its own
evaluation of the child. However, if a parent disagrees with the
results of the school district’s evaluation, that parent has the right to
request an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public
expense.51 An outside evaluation can be an important way for
parents to challenge the expertise of school districts with independent
experts of their own. And, in theory, giving parents access to an
expert in their child’s disability for free should reduce disparities
between wealthy and poor parents. But the Supreme Court’s
treatment of this right as a counterweight to the expertise52 is
misplaced.

48

Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60. The procedural safeguards include the
following: the right to request independent evaluations of their child when parents
disagree with the school’s evaluation, to have access to the schools’ records about
their child, to participate in meetings, to receive written notice when the district
proposes to change the child’s placement, and to request a hearing before a neutral
adjudicator. See also 20 U.S.C. §1415 (2006) (entitled “Procedural Safeguards”).
49
20 U.S.C. §1415(a) (2006) (School districts receiving IDEA funds must
“establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and
their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards . . . .”).
50
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2) (2006).
51
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2012).
52
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60–61 (“IDEA thus ensures parents access to an
expert who can evaluate all the material that the school must make available, and
who can give an independent opinion. They are not left to challenge the
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or
without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition”). See Elisa Hyman
et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the
Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
107, 126–27 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult for parents without means to obtain
independent educational evaluations. If a school district delays an evaluation or
challenges the need for an IEE, parents who cannot afford an attorney or an
independent expert to demonstrate the need for the evaluation will not be able to
access the right).
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First, many parents do not know they can request an IEE.
While school districts must inform parents of this entitlement, they
typically do so by handing parents a multi-page document entitled
“procedural safeguards,” and the document can be difficult to
understand.53 Second, even if parents are aware of their right to
obtain an independent evaluation at public expense and seek to
exercise that right, few school districts simply oblige. Instead,
districts often move to choose the evaluator themselves or to limit the
scope of the evaluation in order to control costs. School districts also
have the option of initiating a due process hearing to demonstrate the
soundness of their evaluation of the child and thereby to prevent the
expenditure of district funds on an IEE.54
In the best case scenario for parents, they successfully request
an IEE at public expense; the results of the evaluation are aligned
with what the parents consider to be educationally appropriate for
their child; and the IEP team changes course accordingly. But school
districts are obligated by law only to consider the results of the IEE;
they are not required to make changes based on those results.55 This
is fair enough; the independence of the evaluator is no guarantee of
the value of her work-product. Still, the school district’s authority to
flatly reject the results of the IEE, together with the impediments to
parents securing an IEE in the first place, suggest that the possibility
of such an independent evaluation is no cure-all. It is, at the very
least, an imperfect counterweight to the discomfiting dynamics in the
IEP process that can come about as a result of the expertise
asymmetry between parents and school districts. This is not to say,
of course, that the educational expertise of school district
representatives should be given little credence in the IEP process.
The point is simply that the combination of defensiveness by the
school district and uneven expertise in the substance of special
education can leave parents without meaningful input in the IEP.

53

Julie L. Fitzgerald & Marley W. Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special
Education: The Readability of Procedural Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
497, 506 (2006) (finding that only 4% to 8% of contemporary Parents’ Rights
documents are written at or below the recommended 7th-to-8th grade reading level,
making the safeguards too difficult for the average person to understand).
54
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2) (2012).
55
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (2012).
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Parents may also be reluctant to speak out at IEP meetings for
reasons other than an expertise differential. They may dislike
conflict or, knowing that resources are limited, may not want to
assert the primacy of their child’s needs when other children’s needs
are also not being met. This dynamic has been noted by
commentators regarding the special education process.56 The study
of special education process in New York, mentioned earlier,57
revealed that mothers of disabled children sometimes exhibit a
willingness to subordinate their child’s rights to the interests of the
district in order to avoid taking a position that might be perceived as
antagonistic and might harm the family’s long-term relationship with
the school.58 The fact that a child must continue to attend a school
even when the school’s teachers and administrators are engaged in
battle with the child’s parents makes this sort of conflict complicated
for all parties involved.
Finally, the difficulties parents face in IEP meetings are
particularly pronounced when parents and school district personnel
are separated by language barriers and/or socio-economic or
educational divides.
Poor parents, uneducated parents, and
immigrant parents may feel unable to speak up at an IEP meeting and
advocate for their children. They may not understand their children’s
rights under special education law or have the language needed to
advocate effectively. Also, these populations are disproportionately
likely to require special education services for their children.59
56

See, e.g., Engel, supra note 42, at 199 (taking note of parents’ tendency
to work toward compromise with school districts, even when it means failing to
fully vindicate their own child’s rights).
57
See supra Part III.A.
58
See Engel, supra note 42, at 198–99. Professor Engel attempts to
connect this phenomenon to Carol Gilligan’s work relating to gender and moral
reasoning. Id. at 195 (discussing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982)). Engel observes
that it is usually the mother of the child who deals with the school district, and he
suggests that, in light of Gilligan’s work, we might expect mothers to be reluctant
to deploy a “rights analysis” in negotiating with a school district over an IEP;
during the course of Engel’s research, “[t]here were . . . many instances when
mothers drew back from an assertion of rights”). Id. at 198.
59
See Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 112–13 (citing MARY WAGNER ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES
AND
THEIR
HOUSEHOLDS
(2002),
available
at
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It is difficult enough for parents to participate fully in the IEP
process when they have only a limited understanding of special
education law, are not conversant in the jargon that is so often tossed
around at team meetings, and are worried about jeopardizing their
relationship with a school district they must rely on in the long-term
for the education of their child. When the dynamics of socioeconomic status and language proficiency are added to the mix,
parents may be all but silenced. They “describe themselves as
terrified and inarticulate [during the IEP meeting]. Some liken
themselves to prisoners awaiting their sentence, and this courtroom
imagery emphasizes their perception of the judgmental rather than
cooperative quality of the decision making as well as their feelings of
vulnerability and disempowerment.”60
In these instances, when parents do not have the skills or
resources to advocate for their children, the IEP team becomes onesided. Despite courts’ repeated assertion that parental participation at
IEP meetings must be “meaningful,” and not amount to “mere
form,”61 school districts make the educational decisions for the
disabled child, and the parents—without knowing the alternatives—
are left with an IEP into which they had very little input. This may or
may not be appropriate for their child.62
http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf (stating
that one-quarter of the children eligible for special education live below the poverty
line and two-thirds live in households with incomes of $50,000 or less)). See also
Patricia A. Massey and Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law
School Clinical Model For Serving Youth With Special Education Needs, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 271 (2005) (citing a study showing that low-income families are
50% more likely to have a child with a disability than higher income families, and
single mothers receiving welfare themselves have a 38% rate of disability);
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1432 (“The wealth disparity in private IDEA
enforcement is particularly disturbing because children with disabilities are more
likely to live in poverty than children in the general population are.”).
60
Engel, supra note 42, at 188.
61
Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 858 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1485
(9th Cir. 1992) and N.L. v. Knox Cnty. Schs. 315 F.3d 688, 694–95 (6th Cir.
2003)).
62
Professor Kotler writes, “[p]arents are typically unfamiliar with the
technical legal standard [of FAPE]. Thus, they assume frequently that when school
officials assert that a certain program is ‘appropriate’ for a given child, it means the
‘best’ for that child or at least roughly comparable to programming which can be
obtained privately.” Kotler, supra note 41, at 372.

Fall 2012

School Districts and Families under the IDEA

439

B. The Tension Between “Appropriate” and “Free”
The process of negotiating an IEP that provides a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) takes place within a legal and
economic framework that further complicates parents’ efforts to
secure educational benefits for their children. As detailed below, the
federal courts (including the United States Supreme Court) have
declined to put teeth in the FAPE requirement and have thereby
permitted school districts to satisfy the IDEA with relatively limited
effort. School districts, meanwhile, operating under significant
budgetary constraints, face pressure to design IEPs with an eye to the
financial burden of providing special education services.
1. Defining “Appropriate”
There are, of course, many parents who have the wherewithal
and confidence to ask that specific services or goals be added to their
child’s IEP.63 But school districts may resist these requests, and
when they do, the district will set the terms of the child’s education
plan—at least as an initial matter—over the objections of the parent.
The parent may then choose to file for a due process hearing: a legal
proceeding, initiated by the filing of a complaint before an impartial
hearing officer.64 Either party may appeal the outcome of the due
process hearing to a state court or to a United States District Court.65
These legal proceedings test a parent’s claim that the IEP
proposed by the school district fails to provide a free appropriate
public education. As noted already, the text of the IDEA tells us
little about what, exactly, constitutes a FAPE,66 and so it is hardly
surprising that courts have struggled to determine whether and when
an IEP provides an “appropriate” education for a particular child.

63

See Caruso, supra note 6, at 178–179 (this wherewithal is often
connected to socio-economic status).
64
34 CFR § 300.511 (2012).
65
34 CFR § 300.516 (2012).
66
See supra text accompanying notes 23–26. See also Kotler, supra note
41, at 353 (“The Act's failure to define ‘appropriate’ in educational or substantive
terms is one of its major failures and one of the leading causes of litigation under
the Act.”).
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Moreover, to the extent the cases help to fill in the interpretive
blanks, they have fashioned the FAPE requirement into something
rather feeble. The most significant of these cases is Board of
Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, in
which the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that,
through the IDEA, Congress ordered school districts to “maximize
each handicapped child’s potential.”67 The Court took the position
that an IEP need only provide “some educational benefit upon the
handicapped child” in order to pass muster under the IDEA.68 The
Court reasoned that the absence of a substantive definition of FAPE
in the Act is evidence that Congress was primarily concerned with
providing access to education for disabled students rather than a
particular educational outcome.69 Rowley thus establishes a two-part
inquiry for purposes of determining whether a school is providing
FAPE. First, the court must ask whether the district has complied
with the procedures applicable under the IDEA; and, second, the
court must determine whether the resulting IEP is “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”70
In the Rowley case itself, for example, the parents of a deaf
child requested a qualified sign language interpreter to accompany
her to all of her academic classes.71 A neutral hearing officer,
however, had determined that an interpreter was not needed because
the child was “‘achieving educationally, academically, and socially’
without such assistance.”72 The district court insisted that this was
not the relevant question for purposes of FAPE. The question,
67

Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 199 (1982). In contrast, the State of Michigan’s special education code
expressly requires the board of a local school district to “provide special education
programs and services designed to develop the maximum potential of each student
with a disability.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1751(1) (2012). Despite this
language, courts applying Michigan law have generally declined to give it teeth.
See, e.g., Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 645 (6th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Brimmer v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch., 872 F. Supp. 447,
454 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“The term ‘maximum potential’ has not been well-defined
in Michigan law. Further, the standard may be more precatory than mandatory; it
does not necessarily require the best education possible”)).
68
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
69
Id. at 193–96.
70
Id. at 206–07.
71
Id. at 184.
72
Id. at 185.
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according to the court, was not whether the student was “achieving,”
but whether there was a discrepancy between her achievement and
her potential.73 The Supreme Court disagreed, installed the “some
educational benefit” standard, and denied relief.74
In 1997, fifteen years after Rowley, Congress amended the
75
IDEA.
In so doing, it shifted attention away from educational
access and toward educational achievement. The amendments were
motivated by the sense that, while the IDEA had been successful at
providing disabled students with access to education, implementation
was characterized by low standards and limited benefits.76 The
amendments established a variety of new requirements for school
districts in developing IEPs, such as including annual, measurable
goals for a disabled child in each IEP and explicit statements about
the services and accommodations the child needs to participate in the
general education curriculum.77
Congress reauthorized and amended the IDEA again in 2004,
this time driven by a desire to align the statute with the No Child Left
Behind Act.78 These amendments included a requirement that special
education teachers be “highly qualified”,79 increased accountability
through measureable annual goals that contain summaries of the
child’s progress and how that progress was measured,80 and that the
selection of special education and related services be based on peer
reviewed research to the extent practicable.81

73

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185–86.
Id. at 210.
75
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
76
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)-(5) (2006). See also J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch.
Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) (discussing
the 1997 amendments).
77
34 C.F.R. § 300.347 (1999). See generally Archive of U.S. Department
of Education website for the 1997 IDEA amendments, IDEA’97,
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSERS/Policy/IDEA/whatsnew.html (last updated
Mar. 5, 2003).
78
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004). See also statement by
President George W. Bush upon signing H.R. 1350, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
2897 (Dec. 3, 2004).
79
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(C) (2006).
80
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(III) (2006).
81
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV) (2006).
74
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At least one commentator has insisted that, in light of these
amendments to the IDEA, courts must revise their understanding of
what constitutes FAPE and, crucially, abandon the formulation
provided in Rowley.82 Because the statutory requirements for IEPs
are now considerably more specific, the argument goes that it is
appropriate for courts to consider whether school districts comply
with these requirements, rather than engaging a Rowley-style
discussion of whether a child will secure “some educational benefit”
under an IEP.83 The response of courts to these amendments,
however, has been uneven, and many continue to treat Rowley as the
operative standard.84
82

See Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA,
37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 377–78 (2008).
83
Id. at 378.
84
The circuits are split and even internally inconsistent in their definition
of the extent of the educational benefits that an IEP must confer to provide FAPE.
The First Circuit recently explained that while the Supreme Court in Rowley only
required that an IEP offer “some educational benefit” to its student, 458 U.S. 176,
200, IDEA requires “more than a trivial educational benefit.” D.B. ex rel.
Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012). The Court stated that an
IEP must be “reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit.”
Id. (emphasis added). Four other circuits also use the “meaningful benefit”
standard by which to judge the adequacy of an IEP. See, e.g., E.H. v. Bd. of Educ.
of Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 361 F. App’x 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2009); D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d. 553, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2010); Ruffin v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 459 F. App’x 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2012); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty.
Dep’t of Educ., 258 F. App’x 863 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Ninth Circuit, however, distanced itself from its previous use of the
“meaningful benefit” standard in 2011, rejecting the appellant’s argument that her
IEP did not provide a “meaningful benefit” by upholding the district court’s
decision that her IEP provided her “some educational benefit.” K.S. v. Fremont
Unified Sch. Dist., 426 F. App’x 536, 538 (9th Cir. 2011). Since then, the Ninth
Circuit has given up adjectives altogether, requiring “an educational benefit” or
“educational benefits” without any substantive qualifier. K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t
of Educ., Haw., 665 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011); J.W. ex rel. K.K.W. v.
Governing Bd. of E. Whittier City Sch. Dist., 473 F. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2012).
Three other circuits use the “some educational benefit” standard. See, e.g., Sumter
Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); Park Hill
Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2011); Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema
v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Recent cases in three other circuits have, like the Ninth Circuit, declined
to use any adjective to qualify “educational benefits.” See, e.g., M.B. ex rel. Berns
v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 668 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2011); Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty.,
Fla. v. M.M. ex rel. M.M., 348 F. App’x 504 (11th Cir. 2009); District of Columbia
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In J.L. v. Mercer Island School District, for example, a
federal district court in Washington held that the 1997 amendments
to the IDEA transformed special education into a more “outcome
oriented process,” as opposed to one concerned primarily with
access.85 It went so far as to state that “any citation to pre-1997 case
law on special education is suspect.”86 The Ninth Circuit, however,
reversed. It stated explicitly that while “the district court concluded
that Congress superseded Rowley in the 1997 Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act amendment . . . [,] [w]e hold that Rowley
continues to set the free appropriate public education standard.”87
Case law from the Sixth Circuit is more equivocal. A 2004
case provides that “the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful
educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at
issue.”88 Establishing the educational potential of the child as the
benchmark of a statutorily legitimate IEP carries the possibility of
transforming special education law. Under this standard, instead of
inquiring (as Rowley directs) only whether the IEP carries the
promise of securing some benefit above a floor defined by the child’s
current educational achievement, courts would measure an IEP by
reference to the ceiling marked by the child’s potential.89

v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The practical difference between the two
standards may be minimal, as circuits occasionally conflate their terminology. For
instance, a recent Third Circuit case cited the Rowley “some benefit” standard and
then immediately stated that an IEP must provide “meaningful benefit” without
reconciling the difference. G.S. v. Cranbury Twp. Bd. of Educ., 450 F. App’x 197,
201–02 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Marc C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of
Appropriate Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 95
(2012).
85
J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at
*4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) opinion corrected on reconsideration, No. C06494P, 2007 WL 505450 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2007) and rev'd in part, vacated in
part, 592 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2010).
86
Id.
87
J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
88
Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added) (citing T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205
F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853
F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247
(3d Cir. 1999)).
89
Deal, 392 F.3d at 862.
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But a Sixth Circuit decision handed down years before the
amendments to the IDEA continues to cast a long shadow over
special education practice in the jurisdiction, and it is far less
promising for those seeking access to special education services. In
the course of rejecting a challenge filed by two parents to their
child’s IEP, Doe v. Tullahoma City Schools reasoned as follows:
The [IDEA] requires that the Tullahoma schools
provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable
Chevrolet to every handicapped student. Appellant,
however, demands that the Tullahoma school system
provide a Cadillac solely for appellant's use . . . . [W]e
hold that the Board is not required to provide a
Cadillac, and that the proposed IEP is reasonably
calculated to provide educational benefits to appellant,
and is therefore in compliance with the requirements
of the IDEA.90
Nineteen years later, and despite the amendments to the IDEA
mentioned above, school districts’ attorneys routinely cite this
passage to hearing officers and federal judges in an effort to justify
the denial of benefits to a disabled child, and federal courts continue
to cite this passage with approval.91 There is a lot of distance
between a requirement to maximize a disabled child’s potential and a
requirement simply to provide a disabled child some educational
benefit. By choosing to construct the rights-creating language of the
IDEA closer to the floor of possible options, courts have failed to
make the promise of a free appropriate public education anywhere
near as robust as it might be.
2. The Burden of Persuasion
When a parent turns to the courts in an effort to vindicate his
understanding of what is educationally appropriate for his child, it is
90

Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Schs., 9 F.3d 455, 459–60 (6th

Cir. 1993).
91

See, e.g., Z.D. v. Niskayuna Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 1:06–CV–1190, 2009
WL 1748794, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch.
Dist., 411 F. Supp. 2d 722, 732 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
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the parent who bears the burden of persuasion. In Schaffer v. Weast,
the Supreme Court rejected the contention that putting the burden of
persuasion on school districts would “further IDEA’s purposes”92 and
stated that “[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing
challenging an IEP is properly placed on the party seeking relief.”93
In a 6-2 decision,94 the Court noted that it is extremely rare for the
entire burden of persuasion to rest with defendants at the outset of a
case and that the default rule—placing the burden on the party
seeking relief—makes sense, absent any indication from Congress
that it intended the reverse.95 The Court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would be tantamount to assuming “that every IEP is
invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not.”96 The
Court asserted that the procedural protections contained in the IDEA
“ensure that the school bears no unique informational advantage.”97
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that “‘policy
considerations, convenience, and fairness’ call for assigning the
burden of proof to the school district . . .” and lamented that the
majority’s decision places parents at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis
school districts.98
Justice Ginsburg argued that because the
development of education programs lies at the core of school
districts’ affirmative obligation and professional competence, it is
easier for them to demonstrate the adequacy of an IEP than it is for
parents to demonstrate its inadequacy.99 According to Ginsburg, “the
proponent of the IEP . . . is properly called upon to demonstrate its
adequacy.”100
92

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58 (2005).
Id. at 62.
94
Justice Roberts did not participate, Justice Stevens concurred, and
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.
95
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57–58.
96
Id. at 59.
97
Id. at 59–61.
98
Id. at 63.
99
Id. at 64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d
449, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting)).
100
Id. The National Council on Disability published a Position Statement
on August 9, 2005 and argued exactly that
93

[p]lacing the burden of proof on parents, and not on school
district (sic), to prove inadequacy poses significant roadblocks to
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Given the expertise and information asymmetries between
parents and school districts – despite the safeguards of the IDEA –
Justice Ginsburg’s assessment that this decision makes it easier for
districts to provide disabled children the bare minimum in services,
without consequence, rings true. And there is no doubt that this
decision has a disproportionate effect on indigent families, who
cannot afford to hire their own attorneys or experts to help meet the
burden and who are less likely than wealthier parents to access
independent educational evaluations.101
The Schaffer majority relies on the text of the IDEA as
assurance that parents will be able to work together with school
districts and that parents are protected in the process. Justice
Ginsburg, however, is a realist. While a simple read of the IDEA is
enough to inspire hope for collaboration with the school district
toward a positive educational outcome, the IDEA’s promises are not
as hardy as they sound. And finally, as one commentator has urged,
if parents are unaware of the array of educational options—because
they have never been presented with these options—they are simply
not in a position to assess the quality of an IEP.102

students with disabilities to obtain appropriate educational
services. It is school districts—not parents and children with
disabilities—that have the advantage in terms of information and
resources. It is school districts—not parents and children with
disabilities—that are in a much better position to prove that an
IEP is adequate than parents to prove that an IEP is not adequate.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
BURDEN OF PROOF: ON PARENTS OR SCHOOLS? 4 (August 9, 2005).
101
See Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 144; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 125 (Joshua M.
Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“Because an IEP is presumably supported by
the school district’s expertise, a parent can typically succeed in challenging that
IEP only by offering expert testimony. But if parents must pay out of pocket for
expert witnesses, they will be less likely to be able to secure the services of these
witnesses. At least at the margins, these decisions [Schaffer and Arlington] are part
of a ‘pro-school’ trend that further supports the deference that Rowley accords.”).
102
Kotler, supra note 41, at 371.
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3. The Problem of “Free”
Looming over the question of what constitutes an
“appropriate” education is a basic fact about the provision of special
education services: it can be extremely expensive, and there is not
enough money to go around. Some disabled children require one-onone nurses while in school; others need specialized transportation to
and from school; and some need residential educational facilities.
None of these services come cheap. Unsurprisingly, then, financial
considerations provide a constant backdrop to battles over what
constitutes FAPE for a particular child.103 Schools have limited
resources; and, while courts do not expect them to ignore costs in
developing educational programming,104 there are times when the
provision of FAPE will be expensive. There is ample reason that
school districts permit cost concerns to dominate the IEP process,
overwhelming the question of what, ultimately, is appropriate for the
child.105 And where there are finite resources, these resources will be
allocated to those who advocate most forcefully for them, i.e., to the
children whose parents have the wherewithal and financial means to
enforce their children’s due process rights.106
Indeed, it seems likely that the specter of school districts
across the country dealing with crushing special education costs has
contributed in no small part to courts’ reluctance to construe the
rights provided by the IDEA expansively. The population of students
103

See Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864–65 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“Left to its own devices, a school system is likely to choose the
educational option that will help it balance its budget, even if the end result of the
system’s indifference to the child’s individual potential is a greater expense to
society as a whole.”).
104
See, e.g., Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir.
1984) (“Our decisions . . . recognize that cost can be a legitimate consideration
when devising an appropriate program for individual students. Nevertheless, cost
considerations are only relevant when choosing between several options, all of
which offer an ‘appropriate’ education.”).
105
See Kotler, supra note 41, at 368 (“Costs are a major consideration—
sometimes the primary consideration—for the educational agency. In fact,
agencies knowingly may jeopardize a child’s future well-being by providing
inappropriate programming which is less expensive in the short term, even though
quite costly in the long term.”).
106
See generally Caruso, supra note 6; Pasachoff, supra note 6; supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
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receiving special education under the IDEA has grown at nearly
twice the rate of the general education population. Between 1980 and
2005, the IDEA population increased by 37%, while the general
education population increased by only 20%.107
Congress,
meanwhile, has not done enough to help. Congress’s first major
intervention into special education policy was accompanied by a
pledge to provide up to 40% of the excess cost of educating children
with disabilities.108 But funding has never reached even half that
amount. Funding under the IDEA hovers around 17% of these costs,
and states and local school districts are left to bridge the gap.109
According to the National Educational Association, the cost
to educate a general education student is $7,552 per year.110 The
average cost to educate a special education student is an additional
$9,369 per student, or $16,921 in total.111 Especially during times of
economic recession, with tax revenues in school districts falling
throughout the country,112 resource-deprived school districts are left
shouldering a large burden and special education programming
107

Federal Education Budget Project, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Mar.
26, 2012), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/individuals-disabilitieseducation-act-cost-impact-local-school-districts.
108
20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (2006); see also Cory Weinberg, Congress
Unlikely to Fully Fund IDEA Act, POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/promises/obameter/promise/89/fully-fund-the-individuals-with-disabilitieseduca/ (last updated Dec. 14, 2011).
109
Special Education Funding Languishes Under Democrat Spending
Plan, EDUCATION & THE WORKFORCE COMMITTEE (July 24, 2009),
http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=172910;
Terry Jean Seligmann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of
Special Education Law, and What Might Have Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 87
(2012).
110
Background of Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education
Act,
NATIONAL
EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION
(2004),
http://www.nea.org/home/19029.htm; Kathy A. Gambrell, Debate Over Special Ed
Funding,
Meaning,
UPI
NEWS
(Dec.
22,
2003),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/12/22/Debate-overspecial-ed-funding-meaning/UPI-13151072115845/.
111
Supra note 110.
112
Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CTR. ON
BUDGET
&
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(Feb.
09,
2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1214. Michigan cut its Fiscal Year 2010
school aid budget by $382 million, resulting in a $165 per-pupil spending
reduction. Id.
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suffers.
Were Congress to allocate more money to special
education—instead of simply requiring that school districts educate
disabled children at no cost to parents—school districts would be
better positioned to work collaboratively with parents in setting up
education programs and would be able to provide more generous
services.113
C. Resource Disparities
The dynamics addressed thus far—relating to the tensions in
the IEP process, the courts’ permissive construction of FAPE, and
school districts’ tight budgets—undermine the IEP process itself and
ultimately limit the benefits available to children in need of special
education. The realities of formal dispute resolution in this context
only exacerbate these tendencies.
1. Access to Attorneys
As noted already,114 the IDEA anticipates that school districts
and parents will occasionally disagree, and allows parents to initiate a
due process hearing (before a neutral hearing officer) to challenge the
content of an IEP or the procedures through which it was crafted.115

113

This is not to say that all school districts spend what limited money
they have wisely. I have heard many parents of disabled children complain about
money used to build sports facilities rather than to educate disabled children. I
have also seen lawyers for school districts drive fancy cars!
114
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
115
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2006). School districts are also permitted
to file due process hearing requests against parents. Id. As a matter of practice,
however, most requests for hearings are filed by parents. See Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49, 53–54 (2005). As an alternative to the due process hearing, parents
may file a complaint against a school district before the State Department of
Education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151–.153 (2012). Historically, complaints filed
through this process have focused on discrete violations of law: for example,
whether a school is following a child’s IEP or adhering to the timeline for
identifying a child with a disability and developing an IEP for that child. These
complaints contain a written assertion of a violation of the law and propose a
resolution to the alleged problem. 34 C.F.R. § 300.153 (2012). The Department of
Education then investigates the complaint and makes a recommendation to the
school district. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152 (2012). The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA
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These hearings can be complicated for parents to navigate and
difficult for them to afford.116
Due process hearings are court proceedings in almost every
relevant sense. At a minimum, a parent who wishes to proceed to a
hearing must comply with the IDEA’s pleading requirements.117
Once a due process hearing has been successfully filed and the
complaint served, a parent will need to assemble and offer
appropriate exhibits, including relevant medical records and school
records such as past IEPs, report cards, and evaluation reports. The
parent will need to understand the law, which is likely to include both
federal and state special education statutes as well as relevant case
law, and they must be able to apply the law to the particular facts of
their case. Finally, the parent must be prepared to present witnesses
who can testify to the child’s needs, including witnesses with
expertise relating to the child’s disability.
As discussed above, in a special education due process case, it
is the parent who bears the burden of persuasion. Of course, a parent
may choose to hire an attorney to help her through the litigation
process, but a special education hearing can cost tens of thousands of
dollars in legal fees.118 Even if a parent proceeds pro se,119 she can
added free, voluntary mediation as a possible method of dispute resolution. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2006).
116
To get a general sense of the cost of a due process hearing, the
Oklahoma Insurance Group covered school districts up to $25,000 per hearing.
SCHS.
INS.
GROUP,
Solutions
and
Coverage,
OKLA.
http://www.osig.org/content.htm?page=solutions.htm. In Schaffer, the Supreme
Court noted that due process hearing typically cost school districts $8,000 to
$12,000. 546 U.S. at 59 (citing JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., WHAT ARE WE
SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000? 8
(Jean Wolman & Jamie Shkolnik eds., 2003), available at http://www.csefair.org/publications/seep/national/Procedural%20Safeguards.pdf).
A special
education mediation brochure published by the Michigan Department of Education
lists due process hearings as costing upwards of $50,000. MICH. SPECIAL EDUC.
MEDIATION PROGRAM, FACILITATION AND MEDIATION (Feb. 2010), available at
http://msemp.cenmi.org/sites/default/files/Facilitation_Mediation.pdf.
117
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A) (2006).
118
For particularly egregious examples of the expense of due process
litigation, see generally Atlanta Law Firm Charges to County Schools Top $1.7
Million,
THE
CHATTANOOGAN
(Mar.
14,
2005),
http://www.chattanoogan.com/2005/3/14/63675/Atlanta-Law-Firm-Charges-ToCounty.aspx; Kari Andren, School Districts Spend Thousands on Litigation Over
Special
Education,
THE
PATRIOT
NEWS
(Jan.
27,
2010),
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expect to incur substantial expenses in the form of expert witnesses
(whose fees she cannot recover, even if she wins) and lost wages as a
result of work missed in order to prepare for and attend the
hearing.120
It should come as no surprise that having an attorney is
strongly correlated with successful outcomes at trial.121 Wealthier
parents, who have the means to obtain legal representation, are
therefore more likely to sue school districts in the first instance122 and
are more likely to successfully vindicate their children’s educational
rights.123 For lower-income families, who comprise the bulk of
special education recipients,124 it is far more difficult to secure legal
representation.125
The difficulty in securing counsel is exacerbated by the fact
that the IDEA does not provide damages to a prevailing party in a
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/01/school_districts_spend_thous
an.html. See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119
The right of a parent to bring suit under the IDEA without an attorney
in a due process hearing was established in 2007. See Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (holding that parents have substantive rights at
stake in special education and are, therefore, representing themselves in a due
process hearing as opposed to practicing law without a license).
120
The IDEA permits prevailing parents to recoup attorneys’ fees, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006), but not expert witness fees, Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 323 (2006). Even
with the promise of fee-shifting in the event of successful litigation, the prospect of
paying out of pocket as litigation proceeds is prohibitive in many cases.
Legislation has been proposed to allow parents to recoup expert witness fees. See
IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011).
121
Hyman et al., supra note 52, at 141.
122
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1426–27 (discussing the federally funded
national study, JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000? 8 (Jean Wolman
&
Jamie
Shkolnik
eds.,
2003),
available
at
http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/Procedural%20Safeguards.pdf).
123
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1426–27 (reviewing various studies that
have found as much to be true).
124
See Hyman et al., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
125
See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP
IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (stating that
only a small fraction of legal problems experienced by low-income people (less
than one in five) are addressed with the assistance of either a private attorney (pro
bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer).
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due process hearing. Parents are entitled to reasonable attorneys’
fees if they prevail (though not if they reach a private settlement 126),
but attorneys’ fees alone are not a sufficient incentive for private
attorneys to take on special education cases. Without the possibility
of a damages award, private attorneys are reluctant to take on the
risks of this type of litigation.127 A further barrier to obtaining legal
representation is the risk of being assessed the school districts’
attorneys’ fees should the parents’ claim be found to be “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.”128
A small minority of low-income parents may be able to
secure free legal representation from a local legal aid office, their
state’s Protection and Advocacy organization,129 or a law school
clinical program that handles special education cases.130 But there
are very few legal aid offices that handle special education cases,131
126

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (requiring a “judicial imprimatur” to be
deemed a “prevailing party”); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2003) (explicitly applying Buckhannon to
cases arising under the IDEA).
127
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1453 (citing Michael Selmi, Public vs.
Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458–59 (1998)). There are actually very few private
attorneys who even take special education cases in which they represent parents.
The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) website lists only five
attorneys in the State of Michigan who represent parents in special education
proceedings. Find and Attorney / Advocate, COPAA, http://www.copaa.org/find-aresource/find-an-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
128
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
129
Congress has mandated that every state have a Protection and
Advocacy (P&A) organization to provide legal services, education, and advocacy
to people with disabilities. See generally NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK,
http://www.napas.org.
130
Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters:
Toward a Law School Clinical Model for Serving Youth with Special Education
Needs, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 285 (2005) (urging the development of law
school clinics that focus on special education law to address the dearth of this type
of representation for low-income parents and to provide students with valuable
legal training).
131
Special education litigation does not fall under restricted Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) categories. Yet, few offices handle these cases. In
2010, LSC closed 932,406 cases. Of these, 0.7% (6,978) were education cases, and
0.2% (1,916) were special education cases. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION 2010 FACT BOOK 17-24 (2011), available at
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and there are also few of these clinics throughout the country.132 As
a result, many parents have no choice but to represent themselves—a
prospect which is particularly daunting for those parents who
themselves have only minimal education.133
School districts, in contrast, are rarely in the position of
navigating special education litigation on their own; they typically
contract with a law firm or lawyer that specializes in education law.
This arrangement pays off: nationally, school districts win roughly
sixty-five percent of special education lawsuits.134 The expense of a
due process hearing as well as barriers to access to legal
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC_2010_Fact_Book.pdf.
See
also Lauren Roth, Florida Parents Seek Help from Special-Education Advocates,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 2, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-0102/business/os-florida-special-education-advocacy-20111225_1_special-educationadvocates-special-education-individualized-education-program.
132
There are very few law school clinics that handle special education
cases, and even fewer exclusively devoted to education cases. The 2010 Center for
the Study of Applied Legal Education survey, which had an 84% response rate,
asked clinicians to identify the type of clinic in which they teach; not one clinic
identified itself as an “education law clinic.” Of the respondents, however, 4.6%
identified their clinics as “Children in the Law” clinics. Presumably some of these
clinics handle special education cases. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED
LEGAL EDUC., 2010-11 CSALE SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION (May 16,
2012),
available
at
http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE.Report.on.201011.Survey.5.16.12.Revised.pdf. The Wrightslaw website, which is a special
education resource for parents, attorneys, and advocates, identifies fifteen law
school clinics in the country that handle special education cases. See So You Want
to
Go
to
Law
School?,
WRIGHTSLAW,
http://www.wrightslaw.com/lawschool/index.htm.
133
Massey, supra note 130, at 281 (“[O]ne-third of special education
parents are low-income, and one-third of the mothers of children with disabilities
have not completed high school.”); see also Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails
Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special
Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 112–13 (2011)
(“Of all the disabled children eligible for special education services under the
IDEA, one-quarter (approximately 2 million) live below the poverty line and twothirds (approximately 4.5 million) live in households with incomes of $50,000 or
less.”); Phillips, supra note 6, at 1836 (“Evidence suggests that during the 1980s
and 1990s, the prevalence of disability in the United States increased, but only
among families living below the poverty line.”).
134
Christina Samuels, Special Education Court Decisions on the Rise,
EDUCATION
WEEK
(Jan.
28,
2011,
9:24
AM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2011/01/special_education_court_decisi.ht
ml.
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representation creates further parent-school district asymmetry and
makes it still more difficult for low-income families to enforce the
rights conferred by the IDEA.135
2. Access to Insurance
The expense of litigating a special education case is not borne
exclusively by the parents: school districts also bear financial
hardship when they go to a due process hearing. It is the prospect of
this financial hardship that gives parents leverage when negotiating a
child’s IEP with the school district. School districts must pay for
both their attorneys and experts, and bear certain costs incidental to
the hearing, such as paying the court reporter and hiring substitute
teachers while other teachers testify. Moreover, if a parent prevails,
the school district must pay the parent’s attorneys’ fees.136 Parents
with the financial means to hire—or the good fortune to have
obtained free—legal counsel should therefore have decent bargaining
power against a school district,137 unless, of course, the school
district has insurance that covers the costs of defending a due process
hearing. If a school district has such insurance, it significantly alters
the risk-reward analysis of going to a hearing.
Let us take a step back: insurance coverage for school
districts is common and not restricted to the special education
context. School districts operate in a highly regulated environment
and are accustomed to integrating the demands of the legal system
into daily operations.138 Because school districts may be faced with

135

The dearth of special education due process filings nationally, and
significantly fewer cases of judicial review of the administrative decisions, lends
support to the claim that the procedural safeguards of the IDEA are insufficient for
low-income families. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 101, at 126–29.
136
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).
137
Caruso, supra note 6; Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward a New
Role in Promoting Educational Equity for Students with Disabilities from LowIncome Backgrounds, in HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 836 (Gary
Sykes et al. eds., 2009) (noting that “[r]esearch on the implementation of due
process has shown that school administrators are quite attentive to parents who file,
or even threaten to file for due process hearings. Directors often change programs
in order to avoid these contentious, and often expensive, adversarial proceedings.”).
138
Suzanne Painter, School District Employment Practices Regarding
School Attorneys, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 73 (1998) (studying the relationship between
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employment claims or negligence claims, many purchase liability
insurance. But, while it is typical for school districts to be insured
against liability generally, it is a recent—and uncommon—
phenomenon for such coverage to extend to the defense of special
education proceedings.139
In Michigan, for example, roughly eighty percent of school
districts purchase insurance from the Michigan Association of School
Boards (MASB).140 The MASB created a property/casualty pool in
1985 for districts that belong to MASB; and, according to MASB, it
is the nation's largest property/casualty pool serving school districts
exclusively.141 Beginning in late 2007, MASB added coverage for

school districts and attorneys in Arizona); see also Sarah E. Redfield, The
Convergence of Education and Law: A New Class of Educators and Lawyers, 36
IND. L. REV. 609, 618–19 (2003) (discussing the explosion of laws that affect
education since Brown v. Board of Education was decided and calling for better
informed educators and lawyers to deal with this new reality) (“[I]t is increasingly
the case that neither lawyers nor educators can do their work independently.”);
Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing Fear: Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of
Law on Education, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 461 (2006) (challenging the perception that
educators are overwhelmed with litigation but noting the importance of increased
collaboration between lawyers and educators to create a preventative law
approach).
139
In 2010, at my request, the University of Michigan Law School library
staff did an online search for insurance companies throughout the country that
provide special education coverage to school districts. Of the thirty-five insurance
companies surveyed, only five indicate that they provide coverage for special
education litigation. E-mail from Kincaid C. Brown, Head of Electronic and
Systems Services, University of Michigan Law Library, to author (August 5, 2010)
(on file with the author.) For example, the Southwest Washington Risk
Management Insurance Cooperative in the state of Washington provides coverage
of $35,000 per special education hearing and $200,000 for the all lawsuits in the
coverage period. EDUC. SERV. DIST. 112, RISK MANAGEMENT MATTERS (2012),
available
at
http://web3.esd112.org/docs/risk-managementmatters/riskmgmtmatters_fall_2012.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
The Oklahoma School
Insurance Group provides $25,000 coverage per special education hearing.
Solutions
and
Coverage,
OKLA.
SCH.
INS.
GROUP,
http://www.osig.org/content.htm?page=solutions.htm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I
could not persuade representatives from any of the insurance companies to answer
my specific questions as to how the special education litigation coverage works.
140
See MICH. ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., http://www.masb.org.
141
The property/casualty pool had 465 member districts for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 2011.
MASB-SEG Property/Casualty Pool, SETSEG,
https://www.setseg.org/Content/PropertyCasualty/tabid/116/Default.aspx.
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allegations of wrongful acts arising from the provision of special
education under the IDEA.142 This means that, for example, if a
parent requests a due process hearing for a FAPE violation, the
school district’s insurance will cover the costs of its defense.
MASB’s policy provides a $100,000 annual aggregate limit per
member to defend a special education hearing request.143
Ordinarily, when a party seeks to purchase insurance, the
insurer conducts an assessment to make sure the party is insurable, to
assess the risk that the potential insured will incur a covered loss, to
determine the extent of coverage, and to calculate premiums. What
is unique about the special education coverage provided under the
MASB policy is that it was provided, at least as an initial matter, with
no character or risk assessment.144 That is, MASB announced that it
was adding special education coverage to extant policies at no
additional cost to those insured and without regard to individual
districts’ record of IDEA compliance.145 While the coverage is
incomplete—it does not cover districts’ liability for prevailing
parents’ attorneys’ fees, nor does it cover the costs of supplying any
special education services mandated by the court—it does pay for the
attorneys to defend the school district against this potential loss,
which can cost tens of thousands of dollars per hearing.146
The availability of this insurance gives rise to a moral hazard
problem, because it allows school districts to avoid internalizing all
of the costs of litigation under the IDEA. A school district might
refuse to provide an expensive benefit to a disabled child, knowing
that it can incur up to $100,000 in legal fees at no marginal cost.147

142

MASB Headlines, MICH. ASS’N OF SCH. BOARDS (August 20, 2007),
www.masb.org. For more on the reasons that the special education due process
hearing defense coverage was added to the insurance pool, see podcast on the
SETSEG site Special Education Due Process Defense Coverage, SETSEG,
https://www.setseg.org/Content/SetSegMainPage/PodcastsVideos/tabid/366/Defaul
t.aspx. According to the podcast, members must use one of three law firms on the
“counsel panel.” The chosen firms specialize in education cases.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See id. See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
147
Presumably, a district that incurred significant litigation costs in special
education cases would expect to see its premiums go up. But given MASB’s
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This is not to say that school districts necessarily end up litigating
more because they have insurance. The point is simply that districts
are able to negotiate more aggressively because they need not worry
about the costs of a hearing. (Parents, of course, are rarely in this
position.) School districts are freer to define FAPE narrowly and to
write limited IEPs knowing—for the reasons mentioned in Part
III.A—that they may never have to face a formal legal challenge and
that, if they do, they carry insurance against the costs of litigating. In
short, the liability insurance that companies such as MASB provide
expands the bargaining power of the school district vis-à-vis an
already disadvantaged opponent.
There is, finally, an important collateral consequence of
school districts’ access to this insurance. It is corrosive of the
collaborative process that is supposed to take place between parents
and schools in the course of creating an IEP. It is difficult to imagine
genuine collaboration taking place between parties with vastly
different levels of bargaining power. When members of a school
district sit down to draft an IEP in partnership with parents, if the
district has insurance to cover some of the costs of a breakdown in
the collaboration, the district has less to lose than the parents from a
breakdown. And this unspoken reality, in turn, affects the ways in
which the district treats the process.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Scholars and practitioners have recognized the tendency of
the legal process of special education to place parents and school
districts in the role of adversaries instead of focusing on the needs of
individual children.148 One commentator believes that the solution to
this problem lies in better training for educators in their legal
obligations, and in training lawyers to work in the education context
(with an emphasis on their negotiation and mediation skills rather
than litigation skills).149 Another argues that the only way to reduce
the expertise differential between parents and school districts is to
require school districts to present parents with the complete array of
decision simply to add special education coverage to existing policies, at no
apparent additional cost, even this is open to question.
148
Redfield, supra note 138, at 640.
149
Id. at 641.
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programming options to give parents a sense of the range of
possibilities for their child.150 Two other commentators would like to
codify in the IDEA the appointment of advocates for families as part
of the child’s IEP team,151 and another believes that increased class
action litigation is warranted so that benefits awarded to children
under the IDEA have broader application.152
Professor Eloise Pasachoff presents a compelling argument
regarding the limits of the IDEA’s reliance on private enforcement
for the realization of children’s special education rights, given the
gross disparities between parents and school districts. Pasachoff calls
for increased public enforcement and describes various ways this can
be done, such as: (1) creating a unified database that collects and
disseminates information regarding the demographics of students in
special education, the needs of the students, and the
services/placements offered to meet those needs (though with
sensitivity to privacy concerns) to boost transparency;153 (2) initiating
state investigation and monitoring of FAPE provision to low-income
students, which would serve the purpose of reducing disparities
among wealthy children and poor children within a state;154 and (3)
offering financial incentives to states to take steps to ensure that poor
children are receiving special education services that are comparable
to their wealthier peers.155
Professor Pasachoff’s proposals are innovative, and would
undoubtedly be helpful to low-income parents. In my experience
representing parents in the special education process, public
enforcement as well as expanded access to attorneys for parents is
desperately needed.
Parents and school districts often have
significant trouble communicating and relating. It is clear from the
tone of IEP meetings that schools frequently see parents as too
emotionally involved to understand their child’s educational needs
and therefore experience these parents as unreasonable, while parents

150

Kotler, supra note 41, at 374–75.
Phillips, supra note 6, at 1837–38; Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging
Disparities in Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team
Members to Ardent Advocates, 3 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 263, 284 (2008).
152
Hehir, supra note 137, at 831.
153
Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 1465–72.
154
Id. at 1473–85.
155
Id. at 1485–88.
151

Fall 2012

School Districts and Families under the IDEA

459

can barely understand what schools are saying to them. This
dynamic, coupled with disparities in bargaining power, undermines
the IDEA’s purpose and design. Expanded and enhanced public
enforcement of the IDEA would mitigate many of these problems.
And Professor Pasachoff’s proposals—especially the monitoring of
the provision of FAPE to low-income students—would take some of
the pressure off these individual parent-school district encounters.
Additionally, given the growing availability of insurance to
school districts to cover the costs of due process hearings, private
enforcement of IDEA’s guarantees is less attainable than even
Professor Pasachoff realizes. What is interesting and potentially
significant here is that insurance for districts threatens relatively
wealthy parents who, under normal circumstances, would be able to
enforce their due process rights. Most middle-class families cannot
out-spend a school district’s $100,000 litigation budget. The effect
of special education litigation insurance coverage on well-resourced
parents may actually help mobilize these parents to push for
increased public enforcement of the IDEA. As became clear in the
1960s and ‘70s, the mobilization of middle-class and upper-middleclass parents can result in considerable change.156
In concert with greater public enforcement of the IDEA, is the
need to improve parents’ bargaining power against school districts by
providing increased access to attorneys. This access can come from
more legal services agencies taking special education cases, from
medical-legal partnerships,157 which are an expanding presence in the
country, and from law school clinics. There is also (and always) a
uniform cry for Congress to allocate additional money to special

156

See supra Part II.A.
Medical-legal partnerships integrate attorneys into a person’s
healthcare team to achieve improved health outcomes. For example, a child with
asthma needs an asthma medical plan, but also needs her landlord to remove mold
from her apartment. So, too, a child with autism requires medical care, but he also
requires appropriate accommodations and therapies in school to benefit from his
education. For more on medical-legal partnerships, see the National Center For
Medical-Legal Partnership website. NATIONAL CENTER FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.medical-legalpartnership.org.
157
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education in an attempt to ease the resource grab in school
districts.158 This paper can rightfully be added to that call.
V. CONCLUSION
The process of ensuring a free appropriate public education
for a disabled child under the IDEA is rife with tensions and
asymmetries between parents and school districts. Some of these
asymmetries—particularly regarding expertise between parents and
school districts—are inherent, and not the product of congressional
design. Procedural safeguards in the IDEA, such as the ability of
parents to obtain an independent evaluation at public expense, does
some work to alleviate this problem. Other imbalances and tensions
are the result of court decisions, under-funding for special education,
and the fact that parents of special needs children often have limited
financial resources. In this world of limited resources, where the
provision of special education is expensive but lawyers (to defend
school districts from violations of the IDEA) are free for school
districts with insurance, it is difficult to conceive how disabled
students will receive the full guarantee of FAPE.
At bottom, the problem with effective implementation of the
IDEA is the problem of inadequate funding. Assuming that Congress
does not decide suddenly to fund fully special education, we are left
with a hobbled system dependent on the good will of school
personnel and effective advocacy by parents. One of the saddest
consequences is the breakdown of trust between parents and
educators. Parents should be able to trust their children’s schools to
operate in their best interests. But the tension between “free” and
“appropriate” leads many schools to mask denial of services in
assertions of inappropriateness. As a result, parents feel dismissed
and ignored when they advocate for their children’s needs. This
tension has eroded the collaborative nature of the IDEA and has
turned it into a dishonest process of downplaying parental concerns
in an effort to guard the school district’s budget.

158

See, e.g., IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1403, 112th Cong. (2011). This
bill was introduced by Senator Harkin in July 2011. This bill has been introduced
in the past as well. See IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1652, 111th Cong. (2009).

